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A TALE OF TWO OPINIONS
Joseph R. Grodin*
This is a tale of two opinions, with a bit of irony and a smidgeon
of moral. One is by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Ellis v. City of La Mesa,' involving a challenge to the maintenance
of a religious cross on public land in California. One might have
expected a federal court to analyze the issue under the First
Amendment, on the basis of the still extant tests in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. Instead, it found the answer in the California
Constitution-which, in addition to a recently added "establishment
clause," contained from its earliest incarnation two other clauses not
found in the federal constitution. One guarantees the exercise and
enjoyment of religion "without discrimination or preference"; the
other prohibits government from "grant[ing] anything to or in aid of
any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose." The
California Supreme Court had viewed these clauses as building an
even stronger wall of separation than the federal constitution, and
on that basis it had held a cross on public land to be unconstitutional. The federal court, relying on that opinion, found it
unnecessary to reach the federal constitutional issue.
The second opinion is by the California Supreme Court in Sands
v. Morongo Unified School District,2 involving a challenge to a
school district's practice of sponsoring religious invocations at public
high school graduation ceremonies. Given its long history of state
constitutionalism, and its experience in deciding church/state issues
under the state constitution, one might have expected the court to
analyze and decide the case on state constitutional grounds. Two
justices were apparently prepared to do that, but a third wrote an
opinion (which the two also joined) finding the practice to violate
both state and federal constitutions, and two other justices were of
the view that it violated neither.'
That left two justices
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law;
former Associate Justice, California Supreme Court.
990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
2 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991).
' Justice Kennard wrote the opinion for the court, focusing primarily upon the federal
Constitution but containing a section which relied on the state constitution as well. She was
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remaining,4 and these agreed with the first group that the practice
was unconstitutional, but they declined to reach the state
constitutional issue. Instead, they decided that strict application of
the Lemon tests-with which they expressly disagreed, and which
they urged the United States Supreme Court to overturn in the then
pending case of Lee v. Weisman-required invalidation of the
practice. As it happened, the high court did not oblige; retaining
Lemon, it ruled that the graduation invocation practice in that case
violated the First Amendment. The result is that California
jurisprudence is deprived of meaningful development in an important area.
The irony is apparent, but perhaps not the moral. Sands was not
the first case in which the California Supreme Court failed to accord
priority to the state constitutional issue, and this is so despite that
court's deserved reputation as a leader in state constitutionalism.
There have been other lapses, and no doubt when I was a member
of the court I contributed to some of them. The moral is that
we-which is to say the legal culture-have not yet fully absorbed
the principle of state constitutionalism. Unlike some critics, I do not
believe that this is because the principle is not worth absorbing. On
the contrary, I believe the principle is soundly grounded in both
legal logic and political theory. Rather the lapses-which are
apparent in courts around the country from time to time-occur
either because counsel have inadequately presented the issues or
because there are too many tempting reasons for judges to avoid the
responsibility of independent decisionmaking. I trust this new
journal will serve as stimulus to both bench and bar toward taking
state constitutions seriously.

joined in that opinion by Justices Mosk and Broussard. Justice Mosk, joined by Justice
Broussard also wrote separately to elaborate their views regarding the state Constitution.
Justices Panelli and Baxter wrote separate dissents.
" Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian, each writing separate concurrences.
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